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IN THE SUP·REME CO·URT 
OF THE s.TATE OF UTAH 
OLSON CONSTRUCTION COM-
pANY, THIOKOL CHEMICAL 
CORPORATION, Utah Divi-
sion; EMPIRE STEEL COM-




THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9362 
As indicated in petitioners' Brief, the facts in this 
case are undisputed and were submitted to the Tax Com-
mission upon a written stipulation (R-6). 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation holds a prime contract 
with the United States Government for the construction 
of certain facilities near Brigham City, Utah. Thiokol 
awarded two sub-contracts to Olson Construction Com-
pany for the construction of various buildings and other 
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facilities, known and described as Minuteman Facilities 
Package No. 1 and Minuteman Facilities Package No. 2. 
These facilities were constructed by Olson in accordance 
with two lump sum construction contracts. Olson con-
tracted and agreed with Thiokol to construct Minuteman 
Facilities Package No. 1 for $1,124,965.00 (Exhibits B 
and C) ; the lump sum price to construct Minuteman Fa-
cilities Package No. 2 was $734,559.00 (Exhibits D 
and E). 
In the course of fulfilling its sub-contracts, Olson 
Construction Company used and consumed building ma-
terials which it purchased from various suppliers. Em-
pire Steel Company and Fife Rock Products Company 
were two of these suppliers. A sales tax was imposed 
upon and paid by Olson on the purchase of the building 
materials. A claim for refund of these taxes was made 
to the Tax Commission (R-1); the petition was denied 
(R-32); and the sole question to be decided on appeal is 
whether the sales tax was properly imposed. 
No tax has been imposed upon any of the other par-
ties to this litigation; Empire and Fife were merely 
collectors of the tax; and Thiokol has joined in the peti-
tion because under the terms of its sub-contract it has 
reimbursed Olson for the taxes paid. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
OLSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY WAS 
TI-IE USER AND CONSUMER OF THE V AR-
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IOUS BUILDING MATERIALS AND THE 
SALES TAX WAS PROPERLY IMPOSED 
AND PAID. 
PoiNT II 
THE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT BOUND TO 
FOLLOW AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULA-
TION IF SAID REGULATION IS CONTRARY 
TO THE LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
OLSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY WAS 
THE USER AND CONSUMER OF THE V AR-
IOUS BUILDING MATERIALS AND THE 
SALES TAX WAS PROPERLY IMPOSED 
AND PAID. 
Appellants in this ease do not claim to be exempt 
from sales tax under Section 59-15-6, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, which exempts from taxation all sales to the 
U. S. Government. None of the parties involved in this 
lawsuit are agents of the U. S. Government and under 
the leading Supreme Court cases of Alabama v. King & 
Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 and Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 
14, the government exemption cannot be invoked. Rather, 
the contention seems to be that the sale of building mate-
rials to Olson Construction Company were sales for 
resale; that a sale for resale is not a retail sale; and that 
the sales tax only applies to retail sales. 
It is the position of the Tax Commission that the 
sales tax applies to all sales of tangible personal prop-
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erty made to the ultimate consumer of the property pur-
chased, and that Olson Construction Company was the 
user and consumer of the materials in question. 
Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, imposes a sales tax upon every ''retail sale of 
tangible personal property made within the state of 
Utah.'' The term ''retail sale'' is defined in Section 
59-15-2 (e) as "every sale within the state of Utah by a 
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer, except such 
sales as are defined as wholesale sales or otherwise ex-
empted by the terms of this act''; and the term ''retailer'' 
is defined in the same section as ''a person doing a regu-
larly organized retail business in tangible personal prop-
erty, known to the public as such and selling to the user 
or con.sumer and not for resale." Section 59-15-2 (d) 
defines the term ''wholesale'' to mean ''the sale of tan-
gible personal property by wholesalers to retail mer-
chants, jobbers, dealers, or other wholesalers for resale, 
and does not include a sale by wholesalers or retailers to 
users or consumers not for resale, except as otherwise 
hereinafter specified. 
The question as to whether a contractor is a user or 
consumer and thus liable for sales tax on the purchase 
of building materials has already been clearly decided 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Utah Concrete 
Products Corporation v. State Ta.x Co1nmission, 101 Utah 
513, 125 P. 2d 408. As in the case presently before the 
Court, that case involved the sale of products made by a 
manufacturer of building materials to contractors for 
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use upon a public construction contract. Because this 
case is directly in point, we quote at length from the 
language of the Court : 
"It is the plaintiff's position that a sale by them 
as manufacturers to contractors for use in private 
and public construction is not a 'retail sale' with-
in the contemplation of the act. The defendant Tax 
Commission contends that by the provisions of the 
act it is 'apparent that the sales tax applies to the 
sale to the ultimate ''user or consumer.'' ' 
Under paragraph (e), Section 2, Chapter 20, Laws 
of Utah, Second Special Session, 1933, as amended 
by Laws 1939 c. 103, amending the original act of 
1933, it states the term 'retailer' to mean 
'a person doing a regularly organized retail busi-
ness in tangible personal property, known to the 
public as such and selling to the user or consumer 
and not for resale, and includes commission mer-
chants and all persons regularly engaged in the 
business of selling to users or consumers within 
the state of Utah * * * The term ''retail sale'' 
means every sale within the state of Utah by a 
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer, ex-
cept such sales as are defined as wholesale sales 
or otherwise exempted by the terms of this act 
* * *.' (Emphasis by the Court) 
* * * 
From the context of our statute 'used' and 'con-
sumed' may be said to express the same meaning-
to make use of, to employ, and does not necessarily 
mean the immediate destruction or extermination 
or change in form of the article or commodity. 
The paramount question then turns upon the prop-
osition of whether the contractors to whom the 
plaintiffs sold their products were 'users' or 'con-
sumers' within the meaning of the act or whether 
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they were mere dealers in the products reselling 
to the third parties. 
* * * 
... in the instant case, contractors purchase the 
pipes, culverts and cinder blocks for the purpose 
of using and consuming them by incorporating 
them as one of many units which go to make up 
buildings, structures, or roads, as the case might 
be, and not for reselling them as such in their origi-
nal form, but for the purpose of changing their 
very nature from personal to real property. In 
short, labor and many other materials enter along 
with the plaintiffs' products to make up the par-
ticular structure, and they are all used or con-
sumed in the process of producing a new entity ... 
In the case of the City of St. Louis v. Smith, 342 
Mo. 317, 114 S.W. 2d 1017, 1019, under a retail 
sales statute similar in intent and wording to ours, 
building, paving and sewer contractors were held 
liable for the tax as 'consumers,' and it was the 
dealer's duty to collect the tax at time of sale. The 
court stated that in its 'judgment the contractors 
in this case did not buy the materials in question 
for the purpose of reselling such materials to the 
city. They were under contract to deliver to the 
city a finished product. It was the inseparable 
comingling of labor and material that produced 
the finished product.' 
Again in the case of .Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell, 
212 N.C. 624, 194 S.E. 117, 118, the court on hold-
ing plumbing and heating contractors subject to 
sales tax law, stated that 
'they purchase the materials and supplies, not for 
resale as tangible personal property, but for use in 
producing the turnkey job. There is no resale of 
the materials and supplies, as such, either actual 
or intended, within the meaning of the act.' See 
views expressed to the same effect in Lone Star 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  





Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala. 
465, 173 So. 399; Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Bu-
reau of Revenue, 42 N.M. 58, 75 P. 2d 334; State v. 
J. lVatts Kearney & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77; 
I-I erlihy JVlid-Continent Co. v. Nudelma'n, 367 Ill. 
600, 12 N.E. 2d 638, 115 A.L.R. 491.'' 
Thus, it was held that contractors are consumers within 
the meaning of the Sales Tax Act. 
The only difference between the Utah Concrete Prod-
ucts case and the instant case is the fact that here there 
exists a provision in the contract reciting that title to all 
property purchased by the contractor shall pass to and 
vest in the government immediately upon delivery to the 
site. The government was not even a party to this con-
tract. It would seem unreasonable to believe that the 
Sales Tax Act could be completely circumvented by the 
simple insertion of this clause in the construction con-
tract between Thiokol Chemical Corporation and Olson 
Construction Company. 
The above is especially true when the nature of the 
contract is carefully examined. Thiokol did not contract 
with Olson for the purchase of a load of lumber, a pile 
of bricks, or a keg of nails; on the contrary, they were 
only interested in contracting for the construction of a 
complete facility. This is clearly evident by the State-
ment of Work as provided at page 1 of the basic contracts 
(Exhibits Band D): 
"Contractor agrees to furnish all plant, labor and 
materials, equipment and supplies and to perform 
all operations in connection with the construction 
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. of a complete facility as indicated in the Cost 
Schedule of Bid Items, in strict accordance with 
the specifications, schedules, drawings and con-
ditions.'' (emphasis supplied) 
That Thiokol or the United States Government did 
not in reality repurchase from Olson the building mate-
rials as such is further evidenced by the fact that accept-
ance of the completed facility was subject to inspection 
(Clause 9 of General Conditions of Contract, Exhibits C 
and E) ; and also that Olson had the sole responsibility for 
all materials upon which payments had been received and 
the responsibility for restoration of all damaged work 
(Clause 7 (c) of General Conditions of Contract, Exhibits 
C and E). 
From a realistic standpoint, Olson Construction 
Company performed and completed its construction con- j ~ 
tract in the same customary manner as any other con-
tractor. Because of such facts, Olson cannot he considered 
as a wholesaler of building supplies which it used and 
consumed in the performance of its contract and which 
were never at any time used or consumed by either Thio-
kol Chemical Corporation or the United States Gov-
ernment. 
Appellants have cited two Connecticut cases in sup-
port of their position. These cases, however, involve the 
interpretation of Connecticut statutes, which are en-
tirely different from the Utah Sales Tax Act. The Cou-
necticut Act does not necessarily impose the tax upon the 
user or consumer as does the Utah Tax Law. It seems 
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('ll'nr from the definitions in the statute and from the 
Utah Concrete Products case, previously referred to, that 
under the Utah Law the legislative intent was to impose 
a sales tax upon all sales of tangible personal property 
made to the consumer or user of said property. 
POINT II 
TI-IE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT BOUND TO 
FOLLOW AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULA-
TION IF SAID REGULATION IS CONTRARY 
TO THE LAW. 
As the Petitioners have pointed out in their brief, it 
is true that under Sales Tax Regulation 58, as it was 
originally promulgated, Olson Construction Company 
':vTould be considered a purchaser for resale and thus not 
subject to the Sales Tax Act. However, it is apparent 
from the provisions of the Act and the Utah Cone rete 
Produ.cts case previously cited, that such regulation had 
no legal basis and was completely contrary to the law. 
It is no doubt embarrassing to the State Tax Com-
mission to have to admit an error and amend a published 
regulation. It further cannot be argued that such policy 
makes for good public relations. The error was certain-
ly unfortunate for all concerned. However, when the mat-
ter was brought to the attention of the Commission there 
was no other alternative but to recognize the mistake and 
take immediate steps to correct it. The regulation was, 
therefore, amended July 1, 1959, to conform to the law. 
The Commission not only had the power but it had the 
duty to rectify its error. 
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Section 59-15-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, gives 
the State Tax Commission power to prescribe rules and 
regulations only so long as they are ''in conformity with 
this Act.'' This point was stressed in the case of Western 
Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 
227, 48 P. 2d 526, where it was stated by the Utah Su-
preme Court that the legislative power to determine who 
is or is not to be taxed is vested in the Legislature and the 
people of the State of Utah, and not in the Tax Com-
mission. To put it in the language of the court, "The 
Commission is empowered merely to make rules and reg-
ulations, etc., in conformity with the Act.'' If the authori-
zation to make rules and regulations were to go beyond 
this, such would constitute an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power. In other words, the Tax Commis-
sion has no power to change the legislative intention. It 
was further stated in the case of Utah Concrete Products 
Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 
P. 2d 408, that ''Governmental agencies cannot deprive 
the Courts of their judicial functions, nor can the agen-
cies extend the operation of the statute by administrative 
regulations.'' 
The case of Howard Pore Inc. v. Nims, State Commis-
sioner of Revenue, 33 N.W. 2d 657, decided by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court involved changes made in an ad-
ministrative regulation. There, the court held as follows: 
''the liability for the payment of taxes, and the 
determination of the amount thereof, depend on 
the statute. Such liability may not be imposed by 
rules or regulations of the department. (citation) 
10 
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By the same process of reasoning, liability for a 
tax imposed by statute may not be obviated by 
administrative action on the part of those charged 
with enforcing the law .... Administrative in-
terpretation is not binding on the court and must 
be rejected if not in accord with the intent of the 
legislature.'' 
In Peoples Gas & Electric Co. v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 28 N.W. 2d 799 (Iowa), it was stated that "although 
stability in such rules and regulations is desirable it does 
not follow that they may not be changed or corrected by 
the Commission.'' 
In Mercha(fl,ts Nation.al Bank v. Com.mission.er of Jn,-
ternal Revenue, 199 F. 2d 657 it was held that "the Com-
missioner has the power to overrule or modify a subordi-
nate ruling, or even his own if he considers it unsound." 
And in National Labor Relations Boa.rd v. National 
Container Corp., 211 F. 2d 525, it was stated that reliance 
upon a Board rule will not estop the Board from applying 
a new rule in an appropriate case where the application 
of the new rule will effectuate the purpose of the Act. 
Petitioners have cited cases holding that a regulation 
cannot be applied retroactively. None of these cases, how-
ever, involve a regulation which was void or inoperative 
from the beginning because of being contrary to the law. 
The cases are not in point. 
Petitioners' brief further gives the impression that 
they relied upon the early regulation to their detriment. 
The facts, however, do not bear this out. Petitioners 
Fife Rock Products Company and Empire Steel Com-
11 
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pany were not hurt because they collected the tax from 
Olson and paid it to the State Tax Commission. Olson 
Construction Company is not hurt because Thiokol reim-
bursed them for all taxes paid pursuant to their contract. 
And Thiokol is not hurt because under their prime con-
tract with the United States Government, they are entitled 
to be reimbursed for all direct and indirect costs in con-
nection with the construction of the facility. 
Further, under the old regulation, a contractor 
claiming to be exempt was required to obtain a Sales 
Tax License and secure a clearance with the State Tax 
Commission prior to making any purchases. Olson did 
not obtain the necessary clearance as contemplated by 
the regulation and later when they attempted to do so 
the same was denied (R. 7 and 8). It would seem unreason-
able to permit Olson to claim benefit of a regulation 
to which they themselves did not comply. 
None of the Petitioners suffered any damage as a 
result of the Tax Commission's amendment to Sales Tax 
Regulation 58. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
Tax Commission should be affirmed and that petitioners' 
claim for refund should be denied. 
Respectully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General 
DAVID E. WEST, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
